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The State's Interest in Adoption and
Washington's Sealed Records Policy
Increasing demand among adopted children to obtain access
to their adoption records1 has precipitated several constitutional
challenges to the state sealed records statutes. Although a
minority of states currently allow adult' adoptees to inspect
their original birth certificates and court records, the majority of
states, including Washington, have a sealed records policy
preventing access to such information unless the adoptee shows
good causes for their release.' In challenging the constitutional-
1. Adoptees' demands resulted in the formation of both national and local organiza-
tions designed to change the sealed records policy prevalent in many states to a system
of unrestricted access, at least once the adoptee reaches the age of majority. One such
national organization is the "Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association" (ALMA).
Adoptees in the state of Washington have formed the Washington Adoptee's Rights
Movement with similar objectives.
2. Several states allow adoptees access to some or all of their records containing
adoption information. Of these, most require the adoptee to reach the age of majority
before the privilege is granted. The following statutes grant access to adult adoptees
while retaining confidentiality measures during the adoptee's minority: ALA. CODE § 26-
10-4 (1975);. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-51 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1980); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 14-15-16 (Repl. Vol. 3, Supp. 1979) (identifying information available upon
reaching age 21 but only with genetic parent's consent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-23(d)
(1956); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-427 (1977); VA.
CODE § 63.1-236 (1980).
3. Although there is no clear statutory definition of the good cause requirement,
some courts have interpreted it as requiring the adoptee's interests be balanced against
any conflicting rights affected by disclosure. See text accompanying notes 21-27 and 180-
190 infra.
4. ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975) (records sealed until child reaches age of majority and
requests them, or prior to this time, upon order of court); ALASKA STAT. § 20.15.150
(1974) (good cause is required except where adoptee is age 14 or older when adopted and
signed waiver is obtained. No person is required to disclose the name of the adoptive
parent or an adopted child.); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-121 (1974) (no explicit provision
for the court to order opening of the records); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117 (1971); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1981) (records to be opened only in exceptional circumstances
and for good cause approaching the "necessitous"; identifying information deleted upon
court release of such records); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-104(2) (1978) (court to preserve
anonymity of natural parents, child and adoptive parents); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-51
(1979)(allows access to adopted person upon reaching age of 18); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.181 (West
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ity of such statutes, adoptees argue that the state's refusal to
disclose such records violates their constitutional right to pri-
vacy,5 first amendment rights of access to information,6 equal
protection of the laws,7 and rights under the thirteenth or ninth
1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-419 (1973) (sealed with good cause requirement); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 578-15 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-218 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111'/2, § 73-17(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-5-[3-1191 (Burns Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 600.9 (West Supp. 1979-80) (includes a provision against black market practices);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (Supp. 1978) (records available to adoptee upon reaching age
of majority); Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 199.570(2) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.81 (West
Supp. 1979) (Those adopted prior to 1938 entitled to inspect adoption records, with
sealed records in effect thereafter, although a judicial interpretation states that this seal-
ing of records is not intended to be effective against the adoptee. This interpretation
apparently contravenes the sealing of the records in effect after 1938. See, e.g., Chambers
v. Parker, 349 So. 2d 424 (La. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 170 (La. 1977)); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 19(4) (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, § 5c (West 1979) (a 1972 amendment eliminated the exception which prior
to 1972 enabled adopting parents, adoptees, and persons opposing petition access to the
records without a court order); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 710.67 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT.
§ 259.31 (1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-25 (1973) (available to officers of the court,
including attorneys, despite the confidential nature of the records); Mo. REV. STAT. _
§ 453.120 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-213 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
113 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.140(2) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (1977);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.8-40.1 (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-16(A) (1978);
N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-25, 48-29(b) (Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (Supp. 1979) (nonidentifying information available to
the adoptive parents upon request at time of placement or upon written request of adult
adoptee; adoptees reaching age 21 may request identifying information which will be
disclosed only upon consent of genetic parents, open records policy effective after July,
1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.1(2) (West Supp. 1979) (irregular phrasing of statute
interpreted to be a sealed records law); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 432.415(4), 420 (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 505-507 (Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-15(b)(1) (1979);
S.C. CODE § 15-45-140 (1977); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976) (access to adoptee
upon maturity); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-130,-132 (1977); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4477, rule 47(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-15-16 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 452 (1974); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980) (Adoptee 18 years of age or older may
submit request for information about biological parent or, if under 18, upon order of the
court with good cause shown. In the court proceeding the effect of the release on the
minor child, adoptive parents, and biological parents must be considered); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.32.120(2), .36.030 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
48.93 (West Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1207-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Adoptee's Right to Know]
(the adoptee's right to privacy is said to be within the realm of "marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationship, and child rearing and education" mentioned in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as protected areas of privacy). See generally Note, Due Pro-
cess Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 469.
6. See, e.g., Anderson, The Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, Soc. SERVICE
REV. 141, 149 (1977); Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's
Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L. Q. 185, 192 (1977); Adoptee's Right to Know, supra note
5, at 1204-07.
7. See, e.g., Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records
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amendment.' Nevertheless, courts upholding the constitutional-
ity of the sealed records statutes typically conclude that the
state's interest in the adoption process and the privacy interests
of the natural and adoptive parents outweigh the adoptees'
rights to the information.9
Washington's adoption statute protects not only the
adoptee, but all participants in the adoption process.10 Requir-
ing the adoptee to show "good cause" prior to releasing adoption
information protects non-adoptee participants. Although there is
no legislative definition" of good cause, the Washington Court
of Appeals requires a judicial balancing of conflicting interests
prior to granting the adoptee identifying information." Because
the adoption process involves balancing several potentially con-
flicting interests, s the adoptee's right to access cannot be abso-
Dilemma, 2 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 542, 549-52 (1975); Comment, Discovery Rights of the
Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN
FERN. V.L. REV. 65, 69-74 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Rights of Natural Parent].
8. In ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979), the plaintiffs argued that the adoption statute, denying access to the adoptee's
biological parents, was a manifestation of the second incident of slavery, i.e., abolition of
the parental relation, and, therefore, came within thirteenth amendment protection. For
a discussion of the ninth amendment or unenumerated rights concept, see Privacy
Rights of Natural Parent, supra note 7, at 74-75; Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know
His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 150-54 (1973).
9. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E. 2d 884 (1980); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977); In re Sage, 21
Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.120 (1979). The statute protects interests of the
adoptee, adoptive parents, biological parents, and the state. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d
117, 346 P.2d 672 (1959).
11. A Washington court first interpreted the good cause requirement in the case of
In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978), stating:
There is no precise definition of 'good cause' either by statute or by case law,
rather, the judge must make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Flexi-
bility is desirable in this sensitive area. The court is vested with wide discre-
tion in adoption matters, and its orders and judgments should not be disturbed
on appeal except for very cogent reasons.
Id. at 810-11, 586 P.2d at 1206.
12. Id. In upholding the good cause requirement of statutes similar to Washington's,
courts have concluded that an examination of facts of each case and the balancing
approach best effectuated the statute's attempt to protect the various individual rights
involved. See ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646
(1977).
13. Adoptees' interests include the asserted right to privacy, right of access to infor-
mation under the first amendment, right to equal protection of the laws under the four-
teenth amendment and ninth amendment or unenumerated rights. The adopting par-
ent's interests include the protection assured their family unit by the adoption statute
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lute. Although the current statute appropriately protects the
conflicting interests, the sealed records policy may need precise
tailoring to accommodate adoptees' interests, such as providing
nonidentifying information regarding the adoptee's biological
heritage.1 Nevertheless, the statute requires judicial balancing
of competing interests and because the good cause determina-
tion provides for such balancing, it is the best method of pro-
tecting the varied constitutional and statutory rights involved in
the adoption process.
After discussing the legal effect of the adoption decree and
the purpose of Washington's adoption statute, this comment will
analyze the competing interests of the adoptee, the biological
parents, the adoptive parents, and the state. This article will
also discuss the legislative proposal in Washington attempting to
abolish the good cause requirement. Finally, this article con-
cludes the sealed records requirement is constitutionally sound
and despite the need for further legislative articulation, the good
cause balancing approach is the most suitable method for pro-
tecting the conflicting rights and interests inherent in the adop-
tion process.
In Washington, as in most states, an adoption decree divests
the natural parents of "all legal rights and obligations in respect
to the child." Concomitantly, the child relinquishes all legal
rights and is relieved of all obligations of "obedience and main-
tenance"' 6 to the biological parents. The adopted child becomes
the legal heir of the adopting parent, entitling him1 7 to all rights
and privileges, including inheritance. 8 The biological parent
retains only the right to privacy, a right protected by the entire
structure of the adoption statute.' 9 The Washington legislature,
in seeking to protect the rights of adopted children, adoptive
itself as well as a right to privacy relating to the family relationship and freedom from
interference in child rearing decisions. The biological parents claim a right to privacy
protected both by the Constitution and the adoption statutes. See text accompanying
notes 5-8, supra.
14. See text accompanying notes 183-192 infra.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.140 (1979).
16. Id.
17. The use of the pronoun "him" throughout the text is not intended to refer solely
to the male gender.
18. See WASH. RaV. CODE § 26.32.140 (1979).
19. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.26.030, .32.120(2), .32.150, .36.050 (1979) (these
recent statutory amendments reiterate the need for confidentiality and restrict the
adoptee's access to identifying information).
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parents, biological parents, and the state, 0 enacted a sealed
records statute providing: "Unless otherwise requested by the
adoptee,2  all records of any proceeding hereunder shall be
sealed and shall not be thereafter open to inspection by any per-
son except upon order of the court for good cause shown; and
thereafter shall be again sealed as before. '22 Thus, this statute
effectively bars the adoptee's access to information regarding his
original birth certificate, 8 court records concerning the adoption
decree, 4 and agency records identifying the adoptee's biological
parents,28 unless the adoptee can demonstrate good cause. The
courts, however, have defined good cause narrowly26 and adop-
tion agencies tend to be equally stringent.27 Because of the
20. See, e.g., In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 346 P.2d 672 (1959).
21. Although ambiguous the phrase "unless otherwise requested by the adoptee"
could mean only the adoptee will have access to confidential records. Legislative history
reveals a change of the 1943 term "adopter" to "adopted" in the current version. The
change was apparently part of a general amendment to the act in 1955, but in a state-
ment to the House the sponsoring senators made no mention of the change or any indi-
cation the change was intentional. See WASH. HousE J., 34th Leg. 1104 (1955). Because
the meaning of the particular wording here is unwitting, one can rely on several other
sections of the statute to conclude the legislature intended adoption records remain con-
fidential, even from the adoptee. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.32.030, .32.120(2), .36.050
(1979).
The court reached this result in In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 804, 586 P.2d 1201
(1978). The plaintiff-adoptee argued that the wording gave adoptees an absolute right to
inspect the records, but the court ascertained the statute must be interpreted as a whole
to determine the legislative purpose and that the legislative purpose must prevail over a
technical reading of the words. Id. at 808, 586 P.2d at 1204. Construing the statute's
overall wording along with the legislative purpose of confidentiality, the court concluded
records must be disclosed to the adoptee only upon a showing of good cause for their
release, despite the statute's misleading wording.
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.150 (1979). Washington's provision is similar to a
majority of other states' provisions. See note 2 supra. Also similar to Washington's act is
the UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT § 13(2) (1971), which states:
All papers and records pertaining to the adoption shall be kept as a permanent
record of the court and withheld from inspection. No person shall have access
to such records except on order of the judge of the court in which the decree of
adoption was entered for good cause shown.
23. See WASH. Rav. CODE § 26.32.120 (1979).
24. Id. § 26.32.150.
25. See id. § 26.36.030.
26. Survey results indicate many Washington Superior Court judges consider an
adoptee's psychological need to know insufficient, although the judges are not in agree-
ment as to what "good cause" requires. This disagreement has caused some disparity in
the application of the law, from county, to county and may subject the good cause
requirement to legislative attack in the near future. See notes 166-68 & 184 infra. See
also Moschera v. Catholic Homes Bureau, 42 N.Y.2d 260, 366 N.E.2d 824, 397 N.Y.S.2d
735 (1977).
27. Although agency records are not usually covered by sealed record statutes,
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extreme difficulty of showing good cause, adoptees have sought
access to their adoption records by challenging the constitution-
ality of sealed records statutes.
Recently, adoptees have argued that sealed record statutes
unconstitutionally impair adoptees' privacy rights to personal
autonomy, infringe on their first amendment right of access to
information and deny adoptees equal protection under the law.
Perhaps the most significant judicial directive on the sealed
records controversy was articulated in ALMA Society v. Mel-
lon,2 8 where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
New York sealed records statute, arguing that access to adoption
records should not require any showing of good cause whatso-
ever. Plaintiffs attacked the statute on three grounds. First, they
claimed the adoptees' interest in learning their natural parents'
identity is a fundamental right under due process, privacy analy-
sis, 2' because lack of access can result in serious psychological
trauma, medical misdiagnosis for lack of medical history, a dan-
ger of unwitting incest, and a crisis in religious identity consti-
tuting an impairment of religious freedom.30 Second, they
argued that adult adoptees constitute a suspect or "quasi-sus-
pect" class, requiring a strict or intermediate level scrutiny,
most agencies treat them as though they were. A recent survey indicated that
over 99% of [the] agencies [responding] will not give the adult adoptee the
name of the biological parents without the latter's consent, although a few will
undertake a search under certain circumstances.
Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11
FAM. L.Q. 185, 188-89 (1977) (footnotes omitted). The author also notes the records may
not contain comprehensive genealogical information. Id. Perhaps one explanation for
adoption agencies' reluctance to disclose adoption records lies in their contractual obliga-
tions with the birth and adopting parents, agreeing to keep such information strictly
confidential. Such "guarantees" of anonymity were made by 90% of the agencies
responding to a Child Welfare League survey conducted in 1976. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE
OF AMERICA, THE SEALED ADOPTION RECORD CONTROVERSY: REPORT OF A SURVEY OF
AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 6 (1976).
Washington statutes, contrary to most, require that both adoption agency records
and court records be sealed. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.36.030 (1979). Most sealed record
statutes do not explicitly cover the records retained by adoption agencies.
28. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
29. The Constitution provides that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. Because adoptees are unable to practice the religion of their biological parents,
the plaintiffs claim this constitutes an impairment of religious freedom. ALMA Soc'y v.
Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
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respectively." Finally, they urged the court to apply thirteenth
amendment analysis maintaining that the sealing of adoption
records constitutes the second incident of slavery 2 in violation
of absolute thirteenth amendment rights.33 In Mills v. Atlantic
City Department of Vital Statistics"4 and Matter of Roger B.,35
the plaintiffs contended the sealed records law abridged their
constitutionally protected right to privacy and their first amend-
ment right to receive important information. As in Mellon, they
argued the state also violated the fourteenth amendment by
denying adoptees equal protection of the laws.36 The Washing-
ton decision of In Re Sage,3 7 also involving an equal protection
challenge to the sealed records law, was Washington's first
recorded challenge to the sealed records policy. The adoptee in
Sage sought disclosure under Washington's Public Disclosure
law." In upholding the constitutionality of the good cause
requirement, all four courts recognized the varied interests
adoption statutes protect,39 thereby indicating that adoptees'
31. Id. at 1230. The plaintiffs in Mellon relied on Trimble v. Gordon, 420 U.S. 762,
767 (1977), in which the Supreme Court found illegitimacy "analogous to" a suspect
class. Plaintiffs argued that since the sealed records laws treated them worse than illegit-
imates, strict scrutiny was applicable. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 n. 7
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). If strict scrutiny was inapplicable, plaintiffs
asserted that the adoptive classification discriminated because most adoptees are illegiti-
mates and therefore the statute is subject to the intermediate level of review as applied
in Trimble. Id. at 1233.
32. Borrowing from a speech of Senator James Harlan of Iowa on April 6, 1864,
plaintiffs claimed that the second incident of slavery is the abolition of the parental
relation. Id. at 1237. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Supreme Court
had interpreted the thirteenth amendment as solely prohibiting slavery, not the various
incidents of slavery articulated by courts in defining the concept of slavery itself. Id. at
1237-38.
Adoptees' assertions that they have thirteenth and ninth amendment rights will not
be given textual treatment because neither creates strong arguments for the alleged
denial of constitutional rights.
33. Plaintiffs claimed that thirteenth amendment rights are absolute and not sub-
ject to balancing. Id. at 1231.
34. 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
35. 85 II. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (1980).
36. In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068-69, 407 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1980); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 314-16, 372 A.2d 646, 652-54
(1977).
37. 21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978).
38. Id. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206. The public disclosure act is codified at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 42.17.010-.945 (1979).
39. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231-33 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Roger B., 85
Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068, 407 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1980); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 307-08, 372 A.2d 646, 649, 652, (1977); In re Sage, 21
Wash. App. 803, 806-08. 812. 586 P.2d 1201, 1203-04, 1206 (1978).
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rights are not absolute.40 Although all four courts refused to
.apply strict scrutiny," the Mellon and Mills courts held that
even if the adoptees' interests could be classified as fundamental
or adoptees treated as a suspect class, the state's interest in the
adoption process is compelling42 and, thus, the sealed records
statutes did not violate adoptees' asserted constitutional claims.
In arguing their constitutional privacy rights are violated,
rights that have been judicially recognized as implicit within
constitutional protections,4 3 adoptees assert that adoption infor-
mation retained by the state falls within certain "zones" of pri-
vacy. Members of the Supreme Court have implicated this pri-
vacy interest in activities related to: marriage, 4 procreation,"
contraception,"4 child rearing47 and education.48 The Court in
40. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Roger B.; 85 M11.
App. 3d 1064, 1068-69, 407 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1980); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 310, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App.
803, 810, 586 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1978).
41. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068-69, 407 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1980);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311, 372 A.2d 646,
651, 653 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 812-13, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978). But
see 85 Ill. App. 3d at 1070-75, 407 N.E.2d at 889-93 (dissenting opinion). Justice Rizzi, in
his dissenting opinion, concluded that the sealed records policy was unconstitutional as
to adult adoptees. He stated "an adult's decision as to whether he wishes to know the
identity of his genetic parents is a private and personal decision which he has a funda-
mental right to make for himself." Id. at 1070, 407 N.E.2d at 889. According to Justice
Rizzi, the adoptee's right to know the identity of his biological parents is analogous to
rights previously designated as fundamental, such as matters regarding procreation, con-
traception, child rearing, marriage and family relationships. Id. at 1071, 407 N.E.2d at
889-90. While conceding that despite the fundamental nature of the right, minor
adoptees are subject to the limitations confidentiality provides, Justice Rizzi concluded
the state's interest terminates upon the adoptee's maturity. Id. at 1073, 407 N.E.2d at
891. His reasoning indicates the state's interest must be compelling during the child's
minority in order to impede this "fundamental right." In previous cases where the court
invalidated legislation affecting proclaimed fundamental rights, the state's interest was
said to be inconsequential or irrational. It is difficult to conclude the protection provided
various privacy rights by the statute constitutes compelling state interest, yet must be
extinguished upon the adoptee's maturity.
42. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372 A.2d
646, 653-54 (1977).
43. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy rights, members
of the Supreme Court have found a right emanates from the first amendment, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); the fourth amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1968); and, most recently, from the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973) (plurality opinion).
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967).
45. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 544 (1942).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973) (plurality opinion); Eisenstadt v.
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Whalen v. Roe,49 hinted that an informational due process pri-
vacy right exists,50 encompassing an individual's interest in
avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.5 1 Adoptees' strong-
est argument combines the goal of informational privacy with
the liberty concept of the fourteenth amendment." First,
because informational privacy involves the right of personal
automony, the state's retention of information regarding biologi-
cal heritage is said to infringe on the adoptee's right of "per-
sonhood."" Second, withholding adoption information from
adoptees violates their liberty rights under the fourteenth
amendment by inhibiting the adoptees' growth in mind, spirit,
and personal development." Although similar, the first argu-
ment essentially relates to the state's data-gathering activities
and information dissemination to persons other than the
adoptee in violation of due process privacy rights; the second
criticizes the state's refusal to disclose the information to the
adoptee as violating the liberty concept encompassed in the
fourteenth amendment. To prevail under either argument, the
court must deem the alleged right to be fundamental in nature5 5
so as to be found within the protected zones of privacy recog-
fiized by the Supreme Court.5
The interest must be found within the wording of the Con-
stitution5 7 to be classified as fundamental and therefore consti-
tutionally protected. Courts have not explicitly found an
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972) (plurality opinion).
47. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (the Court nevertheless
upheld state intrusion).
48. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
49. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
50. See Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469,
526-29.
51. Whalen v. Roe, 419 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
52. See Note, supra note 50, at 526-29.
53. Judge Craven of the Fourth Circuit adopted the term "personhood", used as an
alternative to "autonomy" or "privacy." See Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Left
Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699, 702.
54. See Note, supra note 50, at 528.
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (plurality opinion), quoting Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (plurality opinion).
57. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (when determining whether an interest is "fundamental", look to see whether
the right asserted is implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution rather than
making comparisons of relative societal significance).
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adoptee's right to information in the Constitution itself, nor
within the 'zones' of privacy previously recognized."' It is doubt-
ful adoptees could successfully argue their interest comes within
the previously recognized privacy interest in family relation-
ships,5' not only because through the adoption process, the court
severs the adoptee's family relationships with his biological par-
ents and confers the status of parent and family solely upon the
adoptive relationship but also because traditionally the "family
relationship interest" was more accurately the privacy interest
of the parents alone to raise and nurture their children as they
deemed fit.60 The adopting parents, accordingly, benefit through
this privacy interest.
Even if adoptees can support characterization of their pri-
vacy right as fundamental, courts recognize that the right to pri-
vacy is not absolute.6 The recognition of a right to informa-
tional privacy also applies to adoptive and biological parents,
while the confidentiality of the records is thought to protect the
adoptee as well. 2 The adoptee's claim to privacy suffers from
three weaknesses; first, an adoptee's right of privacy has not
been found to fall within the previously recognized zones of pri-
vacy"' nor is it a fundamental right;" secondly, the adoptee's
privacy rights are no more important than conflicting privacy
interests of the adoptive or biological parents; and, finally, the
State's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the adop-
tion records may outweigh privacy rights asserted by the
adoptee. Assuming an informational privacy interest exists or
58. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1066, 407 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1980); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super 302, 310-11, 372 A.2d 646, 651
(1977).
59. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.140 (1979).
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 985 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 346 P.2d 672 (1959); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App.
803, 812, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206-07 (1978).
63. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
It is the opinion of this court that while information regarding the heritage,
background and physical and psychological heredity of any person is essential
to that person's identity and self image, nevertheless it is not so intimately
personal as to fall within the zones of privacy implicitly protected in the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super, 302, 309, 372 A.2d 646,
650 (1977).
64. In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1067, 407 N.E. 2d 884, 887 (1980).
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withholding the adoption records is a violation of the adoptee's
liberty under the fourteenth amendment, the courts have con-
sistently held a recognized right may be subject to judicial bal-
ancinges and may be overcome by either superior conflicting pri-
vacy claims or a sufficiently compelling state interest." Further,
legislative intent in establishing the good cause requirement
indicates sealed records statutes require such a judicial balanc-
ing prior to the release of any identifying information to ensure
all interests in the adoption process are protected.", In Mellon,
Mills, Roger, and Sage the courts recognized that the sealed
records statutes protected the conflicting privacy interests of the
adoptive parents and biological parents, and in addition, served
the state's interest in the integrity of the adoption process.
Accordingly, the confidential policy served an important if not
65. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (protection of a person's general right to pri-
vacy is primarily left to state law while specific privacy interests deemed fundamental
arguably remain protected by the federal constitution).
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. The court in Mellon concluded the confidentiality the act required furthered
several state policies. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979). One policy was to erase the stigma of illegitimacy. Id. Another pol-
icy was to encourage the birth parent to use the adoption process when she is unable or
unwilling to care for the child. Id. A third policy was that of placing the child in a loving
and permanent home. Id. The Mills court added that confidentiality ensures that the
relationship with adoptive parents will not be invaded by the natural parent who later
wishes to intrude into the parent-child relationship. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977).
The Roger court stated:
The confidentiality of adoption records serves several purposes. By providing a
statutory assurance of anonymity to the adoptee's natural parents, confidenti-
ality encourages the surrender of children for adoption and serves to protect
the natural parents from disclosure of a traumatic emotional event and the
possible intrusion into their private life by the reappearance of a child given up
years before.
In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1066, 407 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1980).
The court in Sage stated confidentiality encourages the "development of the adop-
tive family as a stable social unit. The principle of confidentiality also demonstrates
respect for the right of privacy of the natural parents. At the same time, when the inter-
ests of the adopted child demand disclosure, the information can be obtained under the
good cause standard." In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 808, 586 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1978).
The court added the records are "intended to be confidential at all times and disclosure
is the exception." Id. at 809, 586 P.2d at 1205. In contrast to the Mellon and Mills deci-
sions, the Sage court did not deal with the question of whether the states interest in the
adoption process was "compelling" constitutionally. The Sage court required only a
rational relationship between the state interest and the means chosen to effectuate that
interest and found such a rational relationship existed. Id. at 812, 586 P.2d at 1206.
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compelling state interests' of maintaining the integrity and suc-
cess of the adoption process. These courts concluded that a case-
by-case approach more effectively protects each participant in
the adoption process. 9 The adoptee has access to adoption
records upon the appropriate showing of necessity, thus, their
right to access is not totally denied, 0 while conflicting privacy
interests will be considered along with the adoptee's need for
disclosure.
Adoptees also contend the sealed records statute abridges
their right to receive important information, a right recognized
as protected by the first amendment" differing from the right of
informational privacy previously discussed. The right to receive
information presumably helps individuals participate intelli-
gently in society and encourages informed decision-making. 72 By
analogy, access to adoption records arguably will enhance the
adoptee's sense of identity, thereby facilitating his ability to par-
ticipate intelligently in society and to make informed personal
decisions.78 Although courts view the right to receive informa-
tion as an extended form of free speech,7 ' they are not likely to
expand the privilege to include rights more appropriately
asserted under informational privacy or fourteenth amendment
"liberty" analyses. The court in Roger stated: "While the consti-
tution protects the right to receive information and ideas .. .
the First Amendment does not guarantee a constitutional right
68. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979) (state has an important interest capable of surviving intermediate scrutiny); In re
Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068-69, 407 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1980) (only a rational rela-
tionship necessary, but court applied intermediate scrutiny techniques to uphold the
statute); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372
A.2d 646, 653-54 (1977) (state has a rational state interest; although the burden shifts to
the state, when adoptee reaches age of majority, to demonstrate good cause is not
present).
69. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 IlM. App. 1064, 1069-70, 407 N.E.2d 884, 889 (1980); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 306-07, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 810, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
70. In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1067, 407 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1980).
71. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Post-
master Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)(concurring opinion); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943).
72. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
73. See Adoptees Right to Know, supra note 5, at 1204.
74. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 757 (1976).
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of special access to information not available to the public gen-
erally . . . .The right to receive information presupposes a will-
ing speaker.'75 The court added, "[n]or can we consider the
adoptee's right to receive information absolute to the exclusion
of the rights affected by disclosure. 7 Adoptees merely argue
the state must not withhold such information from them
because of the importance of its contents, but, as the Roger
court confirmed, the state need not disclose all information
included in its records, even though that information relates to
the individual seeking disclosure and may be of a personal
nature.77 Furthermore, if the state did not provide for the confi-
dentiality of the biological and adopting parent's interests, the
state is denied the right to retain such records.78 The state must
employ sufficient confidential measures to assure those affected
by the records that their privacy interests will not be disre-
garded.79 Assuming a first amendment right of access to state-
compiled information, adoptees must show that their right of
access supersedes the privacy interests of the biological and
adoptive parents. Moreover, the adoptees must overcome the
fact that sealed records statutes do not completely abridge any
such right of access. The Mills court stated:
[N]o constitutional or personal right is unconditional and abso-
lute to the exclusion of the rights of other individuals.
The statute herein does not totally deny plaintiff's access
to the information they seek. It only requires that they as
members of a class in which there is an overwhelming state
interest must demonstrate good cause in order to protect the
countervailing privacy rights of the natural parents. Such a
limitation is based on a valid state policy of protecting the
75. In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1066, 407 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1980).
76. Id.
77. Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1975)(refusal to disclose hospital
records to patient does not violate privacy or bodily autonomy).
78. Where the information retained by the state is of a private nature, and the state
has an interest in maintaining such records, the state must employ sufficient confidential
measures to maintain the privacy interests of those affected by the records. See Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
79. In the adoption procedures, adoptive and biological parents are given statutory
assurance that their privacy interests will be examined prior to disclosure. Thus the stat-
ute not only provides procedural protection but confers a statutory right to privacy once
the adoption is finalized. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.32.120(2), 26.36.030 (1979); In re
Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 806, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978)(interests of natural parents not
likely furthered if information regarding their identity and background indiscriminately
disseminated).
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rights of others and is not an unconstitutional exercise of state
power.80
Both the Mills and Roger courts correctly rejected the adoptees'
asserted constitutional claims on the grounds that; first, the
information sought was not available to the general public; sec-
ond, the state has a right to retain information and is not
required to disclose such information upon request despite the
fact that it may involve matters personal to the requesting
party; third, the state must protect the privacy interests of other
parties who may be affected by the disclosure of nonpublic
information; and finally, the adoptees' right to the information is
not absolute in light of the competing privacy interests or the
interests of the state.
Another plausible source of support for adoptees is the
Freedom of Information Act.81 Although adoptees have not
asserted this argument in federal court,82 the adoptee in Sage
contended that disclosure was mandated by the state's public
disclosure laws. 3 The Washington Court of Appeals, however,
denied a statutory duty to disclose adoption records because the
public disclosure laws were intended to provide information of
interest to the general public, rather than a single individual.8"
Not only the private nature of the information requested, but
also the broad statutory exemptions, preclude adoptees' access
to adoption information based on either the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act or the state's public disclosure laws. The Freedom of
Information Act exempts confidential information,8" including
80. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 313, 372 A.2d
646, 652 (1977).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977).
82. Although the court in Mills discussed the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1977) in conjunction with the adoptees' right to access, it is not apparent that the
adoptees asserted this statutory right in their complaint. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of
Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 313, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (1977).
83. In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 811, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978). The plaintiff
cited the public disclosure statute then in effect, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.16 (1979). The
public disclosure statute has since been modified. Id. §§ 42.17.010-.945.
84. See In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 811, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978), citing State
v. (1972) Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wash. 2d 503, 508, 546 P.2d 75 (1976). The
primary purpose of disclosure laws is to grant the public a right of action for access to
information retained by government agencies or the courts which is in the public interest
to divulge. Such a statute could arguably grant a right of action to the adoptee but this
result is unlikely considering the limits the act imposes via exemptions and the private
nature of the information requested. See, e.g., 21 Wash. App. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206
(1978).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1977).
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medical files.8" It also precludes disclosure of information consti-
tuting an unwarranted invasion of privacy."7 The state's Public
Disclosure Act similarly exempts information whose release
would violate personal privacy or vital governmental interests.88
Unlike the Freedom of Information Act,89 however, under the
state statutes90 a superior court's determination that disclosure
of exempted material would not infringe unduly upon other's
privacy interest or an interest retained by the state overrides the
state act's exemptions.9 Thus, this process is similar to a "good
cause" showing under the sealed records statute. Nonetheless, a
possible. advantage to suing under the public disclosure act is
that, once disclosure is granted, adoptees as a class would gain
access to such information, avoiding case-by-case determina-
tions.92 Thus, assuming the court found the information sought
to be a matter of public concern, the adoptee would be faced
with a judicial balancing approach much like the good cause
requirement. Accordingly, a right of action based on the Free-
dom of Information Act or state public disclosure laws would
not alter the impediments imposed in releasing adoption infor-
mation under the current adoption statute.
Adoptees also assert that sealed records statutes violate the
86. Id. § 552(b)(6).
87. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
88. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.210(3)-.310(2) (1979). Superior courts may override
the exemptions if it is not necessary to protect any individual's privacy or a vital govern-
mental function.
89. The Freedom of Information Act does not provide for discretionary or judicial
authority to disclose matters exempted by the Act. Matters statutorily exempted from
disclosure under other provisions are subject to the limitations the statute imposes as to
the right to seek release of exempted material. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (c) (1977).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(3) (1979).
91. Id. Disclosure under either state or federal acts would make the information
sought available to the public at large and not merely to select individuals. See, e.g., In
re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 811, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
92. This result is merely hypothetical, based on previous application of the disclo-
sure act. It could be that disclosure of exempted material in particular would always
require a case-by-case determination due to the other interests involved. But theoreti-
cally under the disclosure laws, the court could weigh the interests of adoptees and bio-
logical parents as a class and determine whose interests prevail. This result is directly at
odds with the adoption statute's requirement that individual interests in each case be
examined. It is unlikely the courts would adhere to an approach under the disclosure
laws that would circumvent the policies promoted by adoption statutes.
An additional advantage in challenging the adoption statutes under the disclosure
laws rather than making a constitutional claim, is that the adoptee's interest need not be
deemed "fundamental," merely that personal privacy or vital governmental interests are
not threatened by disclosure. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(2)-(3) (1979). See text accom-
panying note 57 supra.
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equal protection clause." The Constitution prohibits states from
denying "any person ...equal protection of the laws. '94 The
equal protection clause does not require the government treat all
persons identically.9 5 Under most circumstances, it requires only
that a state-created classification bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate state interest.9 s If, however, the state's classification
affects a fundamental right or creates a "suspect" class, the
court no longer considers the statute presumptively valid and
the burden shifts to the state to show a compelling state inter-
est.9 7 The state's interest must also be substantially related to
the means chosen to effectuate those goals under strict scru-
93. Adoptees and commentators have also asserted that sealed records statutes vio-
late the ninth and thirteenth amendments. See Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 154 (1973). See generally Kutner, The Neglected
Ninth Amendment: The Other "Rights" Retained By the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121
(1968). The success of a ninth amendment claim is subject to the court's interpretation
of the word "others"; "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
IX. The term could be construed as maintaining only those rights recognized by the
state. In the case of the adoptee it is the state which denies access and thus a ninth
amendment claim would fail. The Second Circuit recently refused to hold that the sealed
records statutes denied thirteenth amendment rights. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d
1225, 1236-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). The court properly rejected the
plaintiff's analogy that the sealing of adoption records sever the parental relation, creat-
ing the second "incident of slavery." Id. If a parental relation is severed, it is severed.
voluntarily, not by the state. Thus the adoption process itself acts to cut off the relation-
ship between child and biological parents and not merely the sealing of the records. In
addition, the adoption process creates a parental relationship by confirming the adoptive
ties as a familial unit. Unless adoptees are willing to label the entire adoption process as
a form of slavery, then their challenge to the sealing of the records itself cannot be con-
sidered a form or incident of slavery.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
96. See Anderson, The Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, Soc. SERVICE REV.
141, 147 (1977).
97. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1077, 1102 (1978). When a "right" is
fundamental in nature, the level of judicial scrutiny increases. Few statutes survive this
strict level of review because the law is invalid unless the state is able to demonstrate a
"compelling" interest for the legislation. State statutory classifications may burden the
exercise of fundamental rights in two ways:
1) structuring inequities with respect to liberty, property or another interest which
penalizes the exercise of a right independently protected against governmental
interference;
2) the inequalities may impinge directly on access to, or levels of, a right deemed to
be fundamental departing from equality in its availability or enjoyment ("discrimina-
tion" or a suspect class is defined in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53, n.4 (1938)(dictum) as public acts which tend to burden discrete and insular
minorities).
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tiny.98 Thus, there are two ways strict scrutiny is triggered: the
first relating to the nature of the right affected, the second to
the type of classification the legislation creates. Because the
analysis is under the former it is similar to a substantive due
process argument in determining the nature of the right
asserted, and adoptees, as previously discussed,"9 will have diffi-
culty successfully characterizing their right as fundamental
under substantive due process or equal protection analyses. 00
Adoptees may also fail in asserting the second strand of equal
protection analysis because courts are unwilling to classify
adoptees as a suspect class.101 Adoptees argue that limiting
access to their original birth certificates, while imposing no
restrictions on nonadoptees, creates a suspect classification.1"1
The Mellon plaintiffs, for instance, argued that access for non-
adopted illegitimates, but not for adoptees, violated the equal
protection clause.108 Because both of these classes are comprised
largely of illegitimates, the plaintiffs asserted the law employs a
questionable trait to distinguish between who the law burdens
and who it protects.10 4 The court correctly reasoned that the dis-
tinguishing trait between adoptees and nonadopted illegitimates
is not illegitimacy, but rather the independent status of adoptee
resulting from the legal process, not an accident of birth.105
Unlike illegitimates, adoptees have not been subject to extensive
legal disabilities nor severe social stigma as a result of their birth
status 60 that would warrant treating them as a suspect class.
The Supreme Court has also recognized an intermediate
level of review triggered by either a "fundamental interest,"' as
opposed to fundamental rights, or a "quasi-suspect" class.'"
98. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTfUIONAL LAW 1102-04 (1978).
99. See text accompanying notes 43-60 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
101. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 315-16,
372 A.2d 646, 653 (1977).
102. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
103. Id. at 1233.
104. Id. at 1234.
105. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 315, 372
A.2d 646, 653 (1977).
106. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S.- 164 (1972).
107. See L. TRIBE, supra note 97 at 1089-90. Intermediate scrutiny is triggered if
important, though not necessarily fundamental, interests are at stake.
108. Id. at 1090. "Second. intermediate review has been triggered if a sensitive,
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Adoptees have failed to trigger even this intermediate level of
review,'09 requiring a substantial relationship between the means
employed to effectuate the end and requiring an important,
rather than compelling, state interest." 0 Although there are sev-
eral judicial approaches to a question invoking intermediate
review,"'1 courts correctly conclude adoptees do not suffer legal
disabilities or discrimination sufficient to classify them as a
quasi-suspect class." 2 Courts find that either the adoptee's
interest in obtaining adoption records is not fundamental,' s or,
because the statute does not create an absolute bar to access,""
the state's interest in limiting disclosure is sufficiently important
to justify requiring the adoptee show good cause for release of
adoption information." 5
Although the state need prove only a rational relationship
between the legislative means and ends to uphold the sealed
records statute's validity, absent either a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class or fundamental right or interest, both the Mellon and
although not necessarily suspect, criteria of classification are employed." The quasi-sus-
pect designation applies to gender stereotypes, alienage, and illegitimacy classifications.
109. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372
A.2d 646, 653-54 (1977).
110. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
111. See L. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 1082-89. Five types of judicial approaches to a
question invoking intermediate review deserve mention: 1) assessing the "importance" of
the liberty restrained or the objectives of the challenged classification (the state's inter-
est must be "important" although not necessarily "compelling"); 2) demanding "close
fit" by requiring that the rules employed by the government be substantially related to
the achievement of the objectives invoked to defend those rules. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); 3) requiring current articulation by refusing to supply a challenged rule with
rationales not actually advanced by the litigating parties; 4) similarly, requiring that leg-
islative history document the actual purpose of the rule and that this purpose in fact be
a motivation of the enactment; 5) supporting a challenged legislative scheme as constitu-
tional because it provides for exceptions to the general rule rather than creating an
irrebuttable presumption and thus rights are merely impeded and not denied (when
adoption statutes are challenged, the state poses this argument to show the adoptee need
only show good cause to gain access, and therefore the sealed records policy does not act
as a complete bar to information).
112. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
113. In re Roger B., 85 M. App. 3d 1064, 1067, 407 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1980); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 309-10, 372 A.2d 646, 650
(1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 810, 586 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1978).
114. In re Roger B., 85 I. App. 3d, 1064, 1066-68, 407 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1980).
115. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1069, 407 N.E.2d 884, 889 (1980); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311-12, 372 A.2d 646, 651
(1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 812, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
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Mills courts discussed the possible result when applying a higher
level of scrutiny. The Mellon court held that the state not only
has an important interest in ensuring other participants in the
adoption process are protected and in maintaining the integrity
of the adoption process that validates the statute under interme-
diate scrutiny 16 but Mills added this is also a compelling state
interest capable of surviving strict scrutiny." 7 These state inter-
ests are best served by the confidentiality the statute requires, a
requirement promoting the social policy underlying adoption
laws and protecting the privacy of the adopting and natural par-
ents as well as the state's separate interest in the adoption
process."98
Although none of the courts, in upholding the sealed records
policy, discussed the statutory means employed to effectuate the
state's interest, all stated the good cause requirement best pro-
tects the varied interests in the adoption process." 9 The good
cause requirement merely imposes an obstacle to the adoptee,
not an absolute bar to access. 20 Access specifically relates to one
form of intermediate scrutiny;' 2 ' that is, if the state impedes
rights without denying them, then the court is likely to uphold
the validity of the restrictions when supported by valid state
interests. Judicial support of the sealed records policy indicates
that the means chosen by the state are constitutionally sound.
Nonetheless, proper constitutional analysis requires additional
116. In Mellon the court stated, "Even assuming that the classification here were
subject to intermediate scrutiny, it would not violate equal protection; for we conclude
that it is substantially related to an important state interest." ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon,
601 F.2d 1225, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
117. The court in Mills used a rational relationship test to deny the adoptee's
request for access to adoption records. The court added, however, that the state had a
compelling interest in regulating access to adoption records indicating that if strict scru-
tiny were applicable, adoptees would still be unsuccessful in challenging the statute.
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 315-16, 372 A.2d 646,
653 (1977).
118. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1066-67, 407 N.E.2d 884, 886-87 (1980);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 382 A.2d 646,
653 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 812, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
119. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 I1. App. 3d 1064, 1067-68, 407 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1980);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316-17, 382 A.2d 646,
654 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 811, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
120. In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1067-68, 407 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1980).
121. "The fifth and final technique of intermediate review is to require that the
legal scheme under challenge be altered so as to permit rebuttal in individual cases even
if the scheme is not struck down altogether." L. TRmE, supra note 91, at 1088.
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consideration of the means employed by the state. The good
cause requirement of the statute is both rationally and substan-
tially related to the purpose of assuring privacy to participants
in the adoption process because the good cause requirement
ensures judicial consideration of all privacy interests prior to
release. It is not clear what effect confidentiality has upon the
effectiveness of the adoption process. Some states who open
records to adult adoptees argue adoptions have not been
affected statistically. 2 It is arguable that the presence or
absence of confidentiality in the adoption process would affect
either one's willingness to participate in the adoption process or
the growth of illegal methods of adoption. This is sufficient to
satisfy a rational relationship test applicable to the adoptees'
constitutional challenge. 1 3 Despite the paucity of evidence indi-
cating a substantial relationship between this particular statu-
tory purpose and the means used to effectuate that purpose,
adoptees are not likely to overturn the statute on a means-ends
argument. First, all the courts require to uphold the statute is a
rational relationship, 2 and second, the state has another
asserted purpose which substantially relates to the means
employed, that is, protecting the varied privacy interests. The
state need only show one purpose meets the means-ends analysis
to validate the statute.1 25 Adoptees could successfully assert that
the means employed by the statute are not the least restrictive
means. 26 However, in order to expose the statute to such a rig-
orous judicial review they must demonstrate that a higher level
of scrutiny applies.
In discussing the rights of adopting parents, commentators
have classified their interests as nonlegal, nonconstitutional, and
122. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1196, 1213-14 (1975).
123. "This theory of rationality as governing the relationship between means and
ends assumes that all legislation must have a legitimate public purpose or set of purposes
based on some conception of the general good." L. TRmE, supra note 97, at 995.
124. Id. at 996
125. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1247 (1970).
126. The sealed records policy effectively seals non-identifying information such as
heredity traits and nationality, as well as identifying information. If the statutes were
subject to an intermediate level of review, they should be tailored specifically to the goal
of preventing the indiscriminate release of identifying information only. See L. Tnms,
supra note 97, at 1083. A prerequisite of the least restrictive means test, however, is that
the court finds the adoptees have a fundamental interest or constitute a quasi-suspect
class. See text accompanying notes 107-21 supra.
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nonexistent, at least when the adoptee reaches adulthood. 7
127. Commentators summarize the state's interest as (1) providing the adoptive
family with protection from outside interference, (2) protecting adoptive parents who
fear the adoptee will abandon them for the biological parents through a continuous
application of the sealed records policy, and (3) recognizing the need for anonymity of
the biological parents. The author of one law review article believes that the purposes of
the statutes are valid to enable the family to function as a unit, but once the child
reaches the age of majority and is no longer subject to parental control, the family func-
tion is fulfilled. When the adoptee reaches adulthood, the state's interest in actively
supporting the adoptive family's autonomy ceases, because the adoptee is capable of
making independent decisions. See Adoptee's Right to Know, supra note 4, at 1211-12;
Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11
FAM. L.Q. 185, 195-96 (1977)(Klibanoff argues adoptive parents cannot put their own
fears above the child's need for identity); Comment, Discovery Rights of the
Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN
FERN. V.L. Rzv. 65, 79 (1975) (the author states the adoptive parent controversy is a
psychological, not a legal issue).
What these legal scholars fail to recognize is the existence of the family unit once
the child reaches the age of majority. The psychological and developmental needs of the
child and parent do not cease to exist once the child turns age 18 or 21 and other statu-
tory or constitutional rights granted to the family should not terminate on such an arbi-
trary assumption. The child's increased ability to make decisions does not alter the fact
that parents generally maintain a strong emotional tie to their child throughout his
adulthood. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 315-16,
372 A.2d 646, 653 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 806, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978).
The plaintiff in Sage argued the classification of adult adoptees with minor adoptees
was irrational, and therefore violated equal protection. Mr. Sage argued that the policies
underlying sealing of adoption records related only to minor adoptees. The court rea-
soned that the policies of the adoption statute required minor and adult adoptees be
treated similarly when considering the right of other parties affected by disclosure as
well as the state's interest in the adoption process. The court analogized the adoption
process as a "four-way contract between the state, the natural parents, the adoptive par-
ents and the adopted child" and concluded all these interests were served by the contin-
ued policy of confidentiality. 21 Wash. App. at 812, 586 P.2d at 1206. Thus, using the
court's analogy, the adoptee was asking the state to breach the contract previously made,
against its own interests as well as the interests of several of the "contract participants."
The Mellon court admitted some of the considerations, applicable at the time of the
adoption and throughout childhood, apply with less force when the child reaches adult-
hood. The court did not specify what considerations apply with less force, but could be
referring to the need to protect the child from any stigma that may result if information
regarding potential unpleasant circumstances of adoption were prematurely released.
Nevertheless, the court stressed that the state's interest in protecting the natural par-
ents, in addition to adoptive parents, does not wane when the child reaches the age of
majority. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1235-36.
The Mills court went much further in distinguishing between child and adult
adoptees. The court concluded the state's interest in protecting the needs of the adoptee
and the natural parent continues after the child reaches the age of majority, but pro-
posed a judicial compromise to the competing interests by changing the procedural crite-
ria for release of the records. When adult adoptees seek access to their records the bur-
den is shifted to the state to show good cause does not exist. Once the burden has
shifted, if the state is unable to show good cause does not exist, the adult adoptee auto-
matically will gain access without further balancing of interests by the court. Mills v.
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Classification of adoptive parents' rights as nonlegal is pure
sophistry because the adoption laws explicitly protect the pri-
vacy rights of the adopting parent. 128 Furthermore, the adoptive
parent may assert a constitutional right to privacy, as was recog-
nized in Mellon129 and Mills,130 to ensure the integrity of the
family unit. This right of privacy relates to freedom from
outside interference granted to parents and the family unit.18 ' If
judicial protection of the family terminates when the child
reaches the age of majority in the adoptive but not the biological
family, adoptive parents may argue the legal relation of adoption
is distastefully temporary. Although not all adopting parents
would oppose a statutory change allowing adoptees to locate
their biological parents, some fear the child's need to engage in a
search reflects their failure as parents. 8 2 Other adopting parents
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. at 318-22, 382 A.2d at 654-56.
Granted, the approach is a novel one, but such judicial legislation would be contrary
to the Washington statute which requires the adoptee to show good cause to gain access,
making no distinction between adult and minor adoptees. In the Sage case the plaintiff-
adoptee argued the statute should distinguish between adult and minor adoptees. His
argument was rejected because the conflicting interests of the state, adoptive parents,
and biological parents remained vital beyond the adoptee's reaching the age of majority.
21 Wash. App. at 812, 586 P.2d at 1206-07. The Washington court was correct in estab-
lishing the continuing nature of the adoptive and biological parents' interests.
128. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 128, 346 P.2d 672, 674 (1959). Although one
purpose of the adoption statute is to protect adopted children, it is also designed to
protect adopting parents from unhappiness, embarrassment, and heartache by providing
adequate information about the child and by protecting the child and adoptive parents
from subsequent disturbance of the family relationship by the natural parents. ALMA
Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) (recog-
nizing the adopting parents' continuing interest in the family relationship once the child
reaches the age of majority); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J.
Super. 302, 307-08, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977) (recognized the adopting parent's rights to
raise the child without interference from the biological parents). The Sage case recog-
nized the state's interest in maintaining confidentiality and in protecting both biological
and adoptive parents continued beyond the age of majority. 21 Wash. App. 803, 812, 586
P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978). As volunteers to the adoption process, the adopting parents play
a vital role and many may enter into such an arrangement based on the rights afforded
them. Commentators, legislators and courts must consider the possible chilling effect a
reduction in adoptive parents' rights may have on the adoption process in the future.
129. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979) (the relationship between the parent and child is constitutionally protected,
relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
130. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 307-09, 372
A.2d 646, 649-51 (1977).
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring, expressed
the right involved as "freedom of personal choice, in matters of marriage and family
life"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
132. Some adoptive parents' fears may be justified. One study indicates that some
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feel threatened by the child's possible future relationship with
the biological parents.1 83 Those fears could detrimentally affect
one's willingness to participate in the adoption process because
most parents wish to believe the child is their own in every
sense.1M
Adoptive parents may also find protection in the ninth
amendment as well as state and federal privacy acts. The ninth
amendment may provide constitutional protection of the adop-
tive parent's interests by reserving a right to maintain the integ-
rity of the family unit within the penumbra concept of the ninth
amendment. 85 Penumbra rights are those not enumerated in the
constitution or those not granted by the state but considered
intrinsic in nature.3 6 In addition, state' 87 and federal'3 8 privacy
acts reinforce the privacy interests of adoptive parents by assur-
ing that the retention of the state records will not infringe on
privacy interests affected by disclosure. Also, disclosure is
restricted upon a consideration of conflicting privacy rights.13 9
Thus, because adopting parents retain constitutionally and stat-
utorily protected rights, their interests and willingness to par-
ticipate in the adoption process must be considered before any
changes are made to the sealed records policy. Because allowing
parents adopt because they are unable to have children themselves and are likely to be
insecure about their parental role. A. McWNmNiE, ADOPTED CHILDREN, How THEY GROW
Up (1967). But even classifying the adoptive parents' concerns as "merely psychological"
does not mean courts or legislatures should divest them of all protection. The argument
that the adoptive parents' needs are merely "psychological" is a dangerous argument for
legal scholars to assert when they are trying to claim the adoptee's psychological "need
to know" amounts to a constitutional right; thus, the categorization "cuts both ways,"
the result being that both the psychological interests of the adoptive parents and child
are protectable or neither is protectable, depending on the constitutional rights asserted.
133. Id. at 250-54. In addition, adoptive parents may fear the possible confusion as
to disciplinary matters that an active relationship with biological parents might create.
134. Id. at 251-53.
135. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
136. Justice Douglas advanced a penumbra theory of privacy in the Griswold case,
stating specific provisions of the Constitution have penumbras and emanations that
include protections for various subsidiary interests. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481-86 (1965).
137. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.12.080 (1979) (protection of privacy of parties in family
court). See generally WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
139. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, which sets guidelines for the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), ensures that the government's collection and
maintenance of information adequately provides for the individual's right to privacy.
Such legislation indicates the government's continued concern for a general right to
privacy.
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disclosure to adult adoptees may impact the adoptive parent's
willingness to participate in the adoption process, any relegation
of adoptive parents' interests as secondary to that of the child's
may have a devastating effect on the adoption process.
The adoption statutes protect the privacy interests of the
biological parent which may also fall within the right to personal
autonomy protected by the Constitution.140 The public typically
views the biological mother as young, unmarried, and lacking the
means to support her child; therefore, the adoption process may
afford the baby better opportunities in life.141 The statute
reflects this perception and also assumes that adoption will ben-
efit the mother by giving her a fresh start perhaps without later
reference to the incident. 42 The stereotype has validity because
over 60% of adoptees are born out of wedlock, and most of the
remaining 40% represent relative or stepparent adoptions. 1 4
Actual reasons for relinquishing the child vary from concern for
the child's best interests to wishing to erase reminders of the
unpleasant circumstances of conception, as in the case of rape or
incest.1 44 Thus, biological parents' reasons for maintaining ano-
nymity will vary. Admittedly, many biological parents would
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path
of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 526-29 (1979).
141. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308,
372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977).
142. This reasoning was articulated in Mills:
[T]he natural parent surrenders a child for adoption with not merely an expec-
tation of confidentiality but with actual statutory assurance that his or her
identity as the child's parent will be shielded from public disclosure. In reli-
ance on these assurances the natural parent of an adult adoptee has now estab-
lished new life relationships and perhaps a new family unit. It is highly likely
that he or she has chosen not to reveal to his or her spouse, children or other
relations, friends or associates the facts of an emotionally upsetting and poten-
tially socially unacceptable occurrence 18 or more years ago.
Id. at 310-11, 372 A.2d at 651.
143. In 1976, one of every ten adolescent females became a mother before she had
graduated from high school. The unmarried pregnant teenager often represents a picture
of severe emotional disturbance. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION
TRIANGLE 47-52 (1978).
144. A study conducted by Sorosky, Baran and Pannor took a small sampling of
birth parents, attempting to determine the reasons for relinquishing the child. The study
came up with the following results: unmarried and wanting the child to have a family,
68%; unprepared for parenthood, 26%; influenced by parents, 21%; unable to manage
financially, 18%; pressured by social worker, doctor, or minister, 15%; not emotionally
ready, 21%; wanting to finish school and unable to do so with a child to raise, 26%;
father of baby not interested in marriage, 13%; never considered keeping, 8%; did not
believe in abortion, 8%; marriage to the other parent breaking up, 5%; married man was
father of the child, rape, or parents disapproval of the birth father, 3%. Id. 51-2.
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forego their right to privacy if they knew the child suffered from
a severe identity problem or overwhelming desire to know his
biological origins.1 45 Biological parents, though, rarely actively
seek information about the relinquished child.'4 6 This does not
necessarily mean that they are not curious or concerned," 7 only
that they may have weighed that curiosity against the ultimate
disruption such a reunion would cause for themselves, the child,
and the adoptive parents.
Commentators argue the biological parent retains a contrac-
tual right to sue private adoption agencies for invasion of pri-
vacy if they release identifying information in breach of an
express or implied contractual right.' 48 Similarly, they can sue in
tort against the state or adoptee for any such disclosure.'4 9
Finally, they argue that either potential cause of action is an
adequate safeguard rendering unnecessary the adoption statutes'
nondisclosure provisions. This argument, however, fatally
ignores the statute's purpose of preventing psychological harm
before it takes place."10
145. J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE,
265 (1973).
146. Of the adoption agencies participating in the study, an average of 10 biological
parents returned each year seeking information about the child from an estimated 1472
biological parents served by the agencies. More than one fifth of the agencies had no
returning biological parents in a year, and only five agencies had as many as 50 requests
in one year. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, THE SEALED ADOPTION RECORD CON-
TRovEnsY: REPORT OF A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINION 20 (1976).
147. Some biological parents support ALMA's goal of abolishing the sealed policy.
Sorosky surveyed biological parents asking whether they felt adoptees should be given
information revealing their identity. Of the small sample responding, 76% felt that the
adoptee should be given such information, and of those, some indicated they would be
receptive to a reunion while 6% indicated they desired updated reports on the child's
progress. Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma,
2 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 542, 547-48 (1975).
148. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1217-20 (1975).
149. Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 Tui.. L.
REv. 817, 832-35 (1978).
150. Some commentators urge that an adoption agency or the court should act as an
intermediary contacting the biological parent and requesting consent before the adoptee
receives identifying information. See Comment, Discovery Rights of the
Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN
FERN. V.L. REV. 65, 80 (1975). This approach disregards the disruption such contact will
cause and the difficulty of the decision the biological parent is forced to make. Once
biological parents are aware of the adoptee's search, they can no longer make the
assumption that the adoptee will be content without knowing the details of their relin-
quishment. Initiating such a search indicates to the birth parent that the child demands
additional information, perhaps information only the biological parent can disclose.
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A change in the current adoption practice without safe-
guarding biological parents' interests would ignore their role as a
vital participant in the adoption process. Regardless of the indi-
cations that some birth parents would be willing to forego their
privacy rights, those who wish to maintain their anonymity, for
whatever reason, cannot be ignored. Even with prospective
application of a change in the sealed records policy, the exis-
tence of a right to privacy may affect the initial decision to relin-
quish the child. Denial of that right may have a chilling effect on
the biological parent's willingness to participate in the adoption
process in the future.151
The state's interest in maintaining an effective adoption
process encompasses the interests of the child, the adopting par-
ents, and the biological parents. The Washington Supreme
Court summarized the purpose of the adoption statute"" as pro-
tecting the child from an adoption by those unfit, " ' protecting
the natural parents from an abrupt decision to relinquish cus-
tody,"" protecting the adopting parents from unhappiness or
heartache,"' and protecting both the child and the adopting
parents from subsequent disturbance of the family relationship
by the biological parents.' 6" The Washington State Legislature
has attempted to approximate the constitutional balancing of
rights within the statute by directing the court to focus on each
individual participant's rights.18 7 Although statutory and consti-
tutional balancing approaches are similar in application, they
differ in the sense that a prerequisite showing of conflicting con-
stitutional rights must exist before constitutional balancing is
applicable, 1"8 whereas statutory balancing takes place as pro-
vided by statute.
151. Secrecy at least offers many of the birth parents the promise of "starting over"
without later being subjected to any embarrassment or unpleasantness a future reunion
might cause. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 310-
12, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (1977).
152. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.010 (1979).
153. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 121, 346 P.2d 672, 674 (1959).
154. Id.
155. Id. The opinion indicates the statute is aimed at protecting the adoptive parent
from potential unhappiness resulting from an uninformed parental decision regarding
the child due to insufficient medical history. The statute specifically provides that the
adoption agency shall issue a medical report to the adopting parents. WASH. REv. CODE §
26.36.050 (1979).
156. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 121, 346 P.2d 672, 674 (1959).
157. See Id.; In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 812, 586 P.2d 1201, 1208 (1978).
158. See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra.
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The state also maintains an independent concern for the
integrity and effectiveness of the adoption process. The state's
concern with problems created by an expanded black market for
adoptions 59 is an additional factor in the balancing process.
Because of increasing demand for adoptable children, there has
been a greater influx of black market racketeers in the adoption
process. 6° To maintain the integrity of the legal adoption pro-
cess and prevent any further growth in the black and gray161
adoption markets, the state must weigh any legislative change in
the sealed records policy against the possible effects of black
market growth. If anonymity is not offered in legal adoptions,
but can be guaranteed only through the black market or illegal
process, the discrepancy may leave many biological parents
without a meaningful choice. The rights the state seeks to pro-
tect on behalf of the child, the adoptive parents, and the biologi-
cal parent, as well as the state's independent interest in the
adoption process, becomes one side of the constitutional or stat-
utory balance and must be weighed against the adoptee's right
to access in a challenge to the state's statutes.
This balancing technique was judicially applied in Sage, but
the issue arises more frequently at the superior court level.'"
Although the Washington Court of Appeals set a directive for
judicial interpretation of "good cause," it has not established
uniformity among the superior courts.' " The Sage court held
159. Morris, Some Problems Relating to Adoptions in West Virginia and Recom-
mended Changes, 63 W. VA. L. Rzv. 12, 14 (1960). In 1960, Morris indicated that black
market adoptions had begun to affect the legal adoption process.
160. Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VnL. L. Rv.
116, 118 (1967).
161. The term "gray market" is used to mean legal adoptions using partially illegal
means. For a discussion of the "gray market," see Grove, supra note 160, at 121-25.
162. The question most often arises in Washington superior courts. But these deci-
sions are unpublished. Survey results indicate an average of less than 10 applications for
adoption records occur per year in counties other than King County. See notes 183-84
infra.
163. As the Sage court indicated, the lower courts are given wide discretion to inter-
pret the good cause requirement. In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 810, 586 P.2d 1201,
1206 (1978). Such discretion results in drastically different treatment of adoptees'
requests from county to county. See notes 183-84 infra.
New York State courts have interpreted the "good cause" requirement of their
sealed records statutes. A New York Court of Appeals held that the meaning of "good
cause" required judicial discretion. In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857
(Surr. Ct. 1977). In light of the consent obtained from all the affected parties in this case,
the adoptee was able to show the requisite "good cause," based on his need for the adop-
tion information for "mental rehabilitation" purposes. The Anonymous court added that
it was necessary for the court to determine independently whether good cause was pre-
1981] 377
University of Puget Sound Law Review
that consideration of the various conflicting interests is required
to determine if good cause is present,164 noting that good cause
has no fixed meaning, thereby leaving the judiciary broad discre-
tion.e Entrusted with adoption documents, the request for
information generally begins and ends at the superior court
level. Thus differing approaches may define adoptee rights.
Because in Washington each superior court judge views the
meaning of good cause differently inconsistent results abound. 6 '
An example of such inconsistencies is one superior court's
defining the good cause requirement as a "reasonable medical
need" and perhaps a "property interest," further stating a "psy-
chological need to know is not sufficient under ordinary
circumstances.' ' 67
A proposed amendment' 5s to Washington's adoption statute
would make identifying information available to the adult
adoptee upon petition if the biological parents file a consent
form at the time of adoption. If no consent form has been filed,
the court shall appoint a "confidential intermediary if: (1) The
adult adopted person no longer lives with or no longer is a
dependent of the adoptive parents;'6 9 or (2) The adoptive par-
ents of the adult adopted person file written consent to the
sent even if all parties consent. The statute itself required sufficient facts to warrant
compromising the confidentiality of adoption records, not merely the individual rights
affected. Foster parents sought disclosure of agency records identifying the natural par-
ents so that they could free the child for adoption. The court in Moschera v. Catholic
Home Bureau, 42 N.Y.2d 260, 366 N.E.2d 824, 397 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), stated the confi-
dentiality of the record must be maintained to ensure open communication between the
natural parent and the agency. Good cause was not displayed in Moschera. Finally, in an
action to have New York's sealed records law declared unconstitutional on its face and as
applied, plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and
fourteenth amendment rights of the adoptee. The case was disposed of on procedural
grounds stating the adoptee had not exhausted the remedies available to him. Rhodes v.
Laurin, 444 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
164. In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 810-11, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1978).
165. Id.
166. The inconsistency mentioned in the text is demonstrated by comparing King
County's approach, where a mere request is cause enough, with the approach taken in
Yakima County where a reasonable medical need or property interest is required to show
good cause. See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
167. This particular comment by a Superior Court Judge in Yakima, Washington,
was in response to a survey conducted by the author. The survey, "Survey on the Judi-
cial Approach to Washington State Adoption Laws and the Adoptee's Right to Access"
was conducted to assist the author in examining various approaches to the "good cause"
requirement.
168. Washington H.R. 84, 47th Leg., Reg. Sees. (1981).
169. Id. § 5.
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search with the court.1 '70 The confidential intermediary is to
conduct a six month 171 search based on the information con-
tained in adoption proceeding records, the costs to be borne by
the petitioner, with the court setting the fee for such services.'17
Once the intermediary contacts the biological parent, a consent
to release their identity to the adoptee is sought. 173 The interme-
diary can even be responsible for arranging contact.' 74 The pro-
posed bill would eliminate the good cause requirement in all
cases but those where the adoptee is either a dependent or a
minor and unable to secure the consent of his adoptive parent to
conduct such a search.' 75
There are two basic problems with the proposal. First, it
does not protect adoptive parents. There are no provisions
requiring the consent of the adoptive parents either at the time
of adoption or upon the adoptee reaching the age of majority."17
The bill does not require the court to disclose to the adoptive
parents the presence or absence of the biological parents' con-
sent form at the time of adoption. Such information would put
adoptive parents on notice as to possible future psychological
harm. Because the court need not examine the adoptive parents'
interests, the new legislative proposal fails to protect those inter-
ests. Such a defect could subject the legislation to constitutional
attack. 117 The legislature must consider adoptive parents' rights
in parity with the adoptee in light of their constitutionally pro-
tected rights and interests.
The second problem with the proposed statute relates to the
biological parent's right to privacy. The contact of the "interme-
diary" alone can be a disruptive experience, invading the biolog-
170. The intermediary must submit a written report of the search to the court
within six months of appointment. If the intermediary fails to locate the natural parents
within six months, the report must recommend whether further search is warranted. Id.
§ 6(1)(c). The court may order the search to be continued for a specified time. Id. § 8(c).
171. Id. § 6(4).
172. Id. § 6(1)(c).
173. Id. § 6(3).
174. The bill states that an adoption decree shall provide: "That the records of the
registrar shall be secret unless otherwise provided by the court, and the same shall be
disclosed only upon order of the court for good cause shown or in accordance with sec-
tions 3 through 8 of this 1981 act." Id. § 9(4).
175. The adoptive parents' consent to appointment of an intermediary is required if
the adult adoptee is still a dependent of the adoptive parents. Id. § 5.
176. See text accompanying notes 127-39 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 140-51 supra.
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ical parent's privacy.17 8 In addition, the natural parent, at the
time of adoption, had an opportunity to evaluate the positive
and negative aspects of releasing their identity at the child's
maturity, plus successive opportunities to consent to such
release during the child's minority. 17 9 Whether their refusal to
consent was premised on their own wish for anonymity or the
best interests of the child, that initial decision should be
respected. This is not to imply the absence of a consent form
should pose an absolute bar to the adoptee, but the adoptee
should be required to substantiate the reasons for requesting
disclosure. The current limitations on release ensure that identi-
fying information is not released at the expense of the natural
parent's rights to privacy, a right the legislative proposal argua-
bly ignores.
Washington's current adoption laws require courts to con-
sider each request in light of the state's interest in the adoption
process and the various interests the state protects.180 Although
the legislature has not defined good cause, its most recent
amendment to the adoption statute reaffirms a commitment to
the sealed records approach and the confidentiality it pro-
vides. 81 Thus, despite growing discontent surrounding secrecy of
adoption information, the legislature as a whole still believes the
identity of biological parents should remain confidential absent
a specific showing of good cause. Additionally, Washington stat-
utes, unlike most states, forbid adoption agencies from releasing
information without a court order, 82 indicating further support
for the confidentiality of such records despite private placement.
Currently, a disparity exists in Washington courts regarding
the availability of adoption records as demonstrated by King
County granting adoptees' requests without an examination of
good cause, 83 while other counties'" attempt to follow the legis-
178. See Washington H.R. 84, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(3) (1981).
179. See In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 812-13, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206-07 (1978).
180. WASH. Ri.v. CoOE § 26.36.050 (1979). This provision concerns the release to the
adoptive parent of medical information relating to the mental, physical, and sensory
handicaps of the adopted child. The amendment added "said report shall not reveal the
identity of the natural parents of the child." Id.
181. Id. § 26.36.030 (1979). Other states usually allow agencies to determine their
own disclosure policies.
182. See text accompanying notes 162-68 supra.
183. Of the 17% of all Washington superior courts responding to the author's survey
(admittedly a low rate of return, the survey results have been excluded from the text but
they are used here for the purpose of comparing various approaches to the good cause
requirement), all indicated the statute intended to protect interests beyond those of the
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lative intent and the judicial directive set out in the Sage case,
both calling for a balancing of the interests affected by disclo-
sure. This disparity, along with growing public interest in the
controversy 8 s and current legislative re-evaluation'" call for
close evaluation of the sealed records policy. Rather than abol-
ishing the sealed records policy, the legislature should grant a
clear directive of the elements comprising good cause. Such a
directive would clarify the type of need the requesting adoptee
should demonstrate plus instruct the courts as to the weight to
be given adoptee and biological parents' interests. The legisla-
ture must clarify whether mere curiosity constitutes sufficient
cause for release. Although the policy behind the sealing of
adoption records negates the plausibility of this argument, the
courts still disagree as to whether this constitutes good cause.
The statutory wording requiring "good cause" coupled with the
need to protect privacy rights, calls for a greater showing of need
than a "mere curiosity." Such need should amount to a medical
necessity or perhaps a reasonable medical need, and could
include severe psychological problems if adequately demon-
strated.1 87 The rationale of attempting to discover property
adopted child. Most stated the sealed records policy protects the adopting parent and
the biological parents, and furthers legitimate state interests in the adoption process,
beyond protecting the adoptee. The majority of the judges responding also indicated the
most recent amendment to the adoption statutes was a reaffirmation of the legislature's
intent to maintain a "sealed records" policy. When asked what an adoptee might assert
to establish good cause, the judges indicated much depends on the factual circumstances
and that the determination should remain discretionary. When asked whether a "psycho-
logical need to know" would be sufficient good cause, most indicated ordinarily this alone
would be insufficient. Some stated more legislative direction is needed to define good
cause. Diversity among Washington counties makes the application of the sealed records
policy unequal and problematic within the state.
184. There are indications the adoptees' organizations in Washington State may
make another constitutional challenge to the adoption statutes. See CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMzEicA, Tsx SEALED ADOPTION RECORD CoNTRovRsY. REPORT OF A SURVEY
OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 15 (1976). The Washington Adoptees Rights
Movement, a Washington organization generating growing support, would not comment
on their intentions regarding possible future action seeking to strike down the statute.
185. See text accompanying notes 169-79 supra.
186. Id.
187. The determination as to the existence of psychological problems remains sub-
jective. Some courts have found that the adoptees' pursuit of legal action itself indicates
a degree of necessity beyond a mere curiosity. See In re Adoption of Female Infant, 105
DAILY WASH. L, REP. 245 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 1977). Such rules or broad statements
pre-empt the purpose of individualized determinations. If any pursuit of legal action
amounts to a psychological problem requiring disclosure, the adoptee is provided with
blanket good cause in any request for release.
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interests or inheritance rights8" is insufficient because it pro-
vides blanket "good cause" for any adoptee seeking release and
goes against the policy of adoption.'a8 Although determination of
what constitutes medical necessity or reasonable medical need
remains subjective, it establishes parameters for defining the
type of necessity adoptees must demonstrate. The interests of
the biological parents, as evaluated from the circumstances of
the adoption, plus the interests of the adoptive parents, if dis-
cernible at the time of the request, would determine the particu-
lar rigors of the good cause requirement in each case. Although
court approval of the sealed records policy in the Mellon, Mills,
Rogers, and Sage decisions embodies the best method of pro-
tecting all members of the adoption "triangle" and the state's
interest in the adoption process, the statute could be modified to
accommodate some adoptees' needs. A suggested modification in
the current law would require adoption agencies to compile
reports including information on adoptees most often requested
by adoptees ' 90 other than identifying information. This may be
188. Most state statutes cut off the adoptees' right to inherit through their biologi-
cal parents, restricting such rights to the adoptive relationship. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.04.085 (1979). See Sherrin, Adopted and Legitimated Children, 128 NEW L.J. 101
(1978); Note, The Parent-Child Relationship in Alabama: Adoptees, Illegitimates,
Stepchildren, and Half Bloods, 30 ALA. L, REV. 419 (1979).
189. The policy of adoption is to create a familial unit, treating all family members
as if the previous biological ties do not exist. This is evidenced in the confidentiality
provisions of the adoption statutes as well as the inheritance statutes severing rights to
inherit between the adoptee and biological relatives. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.32.140,
.150 (1979).
A study of 58 adult adoptees indicated the majority wished to obtain information on
the age, occupation, and personality of their biological parents, why they had been
placed for adoption and how the adoption was arranged. Some feared the risks of inher-
ited disease. Some wanted only background information, while others desired to meet
personally with their biological parents. Several of those studied had actually learned
something of their biological parents and found out information they would rather not
have discovered. A. McWHINNIE, ADOPTED CHILDREN, How THEY GROW Up 240-45 (1967).
In another study, adult adoptees stated their main goal was to find their natural parents
(60%) and of those, three out of five were looking for their biological "mothers." Thirty-
seven percent primarily wished to obtain information about their sociological and biolog-
ical origins and the remaining few were searching for their original birth certificates for
practical reasons. J. TasmEmois, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCE OF ADOPTED
PEOPLE 15 (1973). For many adoptees, a compiled outline by the court or adoption
agency devoid of any identifying clues would not be effective as a compromise. See Dis-
covery Rights of the Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional
Dilemma, supra note 150, at 68 (1975) (statement by Florence Fisher, Founder of
ALMA, "I want a face-to-face confrontation, not answers from a social worker."). It is
this desire for a personal meeting with the birth parents, regardless of their wishes,
against which the statute must provide protection.
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.36.050 (1979) (this statute deals solely with the medical
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an effective compromise between the competing interests
because identifying information comprises only part of the infor-
mation adoptees find helpful in establishing their identity. Lim-
iting availability of identifying information ensures biological
parents adoption records are released only after careful analysis
of all the interests in a particular case. Using court-appointed
intermediaries to contact biological parents in an effort to gain
their consent to disclosure merely delays the potential trauma a
reunion may cause. It also pressures the biological parent into a
difficult decision without ensuring the adoptee's need to know
amounts to the statutory "good cause" requirements. Once con-
tacted, the anonymity provided by the statute is destroyed.
Total abandonment of the sealed records policy ignores the
interest of biological parents wishing to retain anonymity, as
well as the concerns of the adopting parent, thereby providing
no protection to individuals based on particular circumstances.
Alternatively, disclosure of medical information could give
adoptees a better sense of heredity and essential medical his-
tory.' The statute does not currently require such information
be compiled. 1'" This approach would adequately protect all
rights involved in the adoption process and would not endanger
the permanence of the adoptive family unit. Adoptees still dis-
satisfied or those with special needs could petition the courts for
further consideration of the interests at stake.
Despite various constitutional challenges to the sealed adop-
tion record laws, adoptees' rights are not absolute and circum-
vention of the judicial balancing process currently required by
the sealed records statute would threaten recognized rights
history of the biological parents and does not describe hereditary traits). This method
would not depend on the adopting parent transmitting the information because this
often proves embarrassing or awkward to both the parent and the child. Frequently,
adoptive parents are reluctant to discuss the child's biological background or the circum-
stances surrounding the adoption and cannot be relied on to discuss the information the
adoptee seeks. See B. J .nws & D. FANSHn, How THEY FARED IN ADOPTION: A FOLLOW-
Up STUDY 133-46 (1970). Any age limit requirement on such a proposal would be a mat-
ter of legislative discretion.
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.36.050 (1979). Upon adoption, the information compiled
in compliance with this section is given to the adoptive parents, not to the adoptee. The
purpose of the report is to aid adoptive parents in making medical decisions. The statute
requires that mental, physical, and sensory handicaps be revealed to the adoptive par-
ents and include information available on the mental or physical health history of the
natural parents to aid the adoptive parents in the adoptee's proper health care. Nothing
in this provision indicates hereditary traits or medical information is available to the
adoptee.
192. Id.
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residing in non-adoptee participants in this controversy. The
balancing approach requires the court to examine each individ-
ual's situation in the adoption process to protect competing
rights in any given case. Although the good cause requirement
needs further judicial or legislative articulation to provide uni-
formity, and despite the statute's overly broad effect 1'9 in with-
holding information which would not reveal the identity of the
biological parent, a showing of good cause is necessary to ensure
the greatest protection to all participants in the adoption
process.
Eileen M. Lawrence
193. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979) (the court discussed the potentially overbroad statutory effect in terms of
affording confidentiality to some biological parents who may not wish to be protected).
The term overbroad is used here to refer to the quality and quantity of the records
sealed as confidential. If disclosure would not tend to identify the biological parents, but
would be insightful to the adoptee, information such as religious affiliation, national heri-
tage, or hereditary traits, should be disclosed to the adoptee upon request.
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